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Abstract
The enormous growth in the number of students attending UK universities has
coincided with claims of a crisis in the higher education sector due to sharply
declining per capita funding and a large reduction in academic salaries relative to
those of other professions. Controversially, the UK government plans to resource the
expansion of the higher education system by allowing individual universities to
charge their European Union students a tuition fee of up to £3,000 per annum. This
study contributes to the literature by analysing the state of universities’ finances at a
time when higher education funding is at the forefront of political debate.
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3Introduction
The rapid expansion in higher education student numbers over the last forty years has
coincided with radical changes in higher education funding. Prior to 1997, many UK
students received a means tested grant from their local education authority that paid
all of the tuition fees and made a contribution towards living costs. The Government
controversially ended the meritocratic admission procedure by passing legislation that
allowed English universities to charge their European Union students an inflation
adjusted tuition fee of £1,000 per annum. However, the increase in tuition fee revenue
has been offset by a real terms reduction in the contribution from the public purse.
The resulting £8B to £10B funding gap has forced many academics to leave UK
universities. A continuation of the ‘brain drain’ would be to the detriment of the
economy and the Government’s aim to raise the rate of higher education participation
of 18-30 years olds in England to 50% by 2010. The UK government responded to
calls from universities for increased funding by proposing to allow tuition fees to be
raised to £3,000 per annum if the institution meets the criteria set by the Office for
Fair Access. Students have attacked these proposals because the legislation introduces
a two-tier market where degrees might be chosen on the basis of cost rather than
quality and students might be dissuaded from studying by their fear of debt. However,
vice-chancellors contend that modern universities need higher fees to attract and
retain able staff and to provide high-class facilities for students. Universities have also
promised to offer bursaries to students from poorer backgrounds to encourage them to
enter the higher education system. These controversial proposals were passed in the
House of Commons by a majority of only five votes at the second reading of the bill.
The debate about the finances of higher education motivates this study of the financial
performance of UK universities. The findings have implications for the Government,
university management, parents and students. The remainder of this paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 describes the developments within the institutional
background. The methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents a
commentary on the empirical results and section 5 provides a summary of this work.
Institutional Background
There have been significant improvements in O’ level, GCSE and A’ level
examination results over the last twenty years. The A’ level pass rate increased from
72% in 1987 to 98% in 2002 and the O’ level and GCSE results have followed a
4similar pattern. This upturn in exam results has driven the massive increase in the
demand for UK undergraduate places. Archival date from the BBC and Higher
Education Statistics Association websites indicate that the number of higher education
students has grown from 621,000 in 1970 to 2,086,075 in 2002. University attendance
has risen from 6% of the under 21’s in the early 1960’s to 43% of the 18-30 year olds
in England in 2003 (Department for Education and Skills, 2003, 2). Mr Blair states
that “Universities now educate 43 percent of all under-30 year-olds – six times the
proportion when Harold Wilson came to power 40 years ago, with most professions
now graduate-only,” (Institute for Public Policy Research, 14 January 2004). Table 1
shows the improvements in GCSE and A’ level exam results and the increase in the
number of students admitted from 290,596 to 368,115 between 1994 and 2002. The
rapid increase in undergraduate numbers prompted the Higher Education Funding
Council for England (HEFCE) to create a target of 50% higher education participation
by 2010. Expansion at such a rate would stretch the budgets of any industry without a
substantial injection of resources.
-Insert Table 1 about here-
The growth in student numbers has coincided with radical changes in the funding of
UK higher education (HE). Successive governments responded to increasing numbers
by cutting the student grant that contributed towards tuition fees and subsistence
costs. In 1997, legislation was passed that allowed English universities to charge their
European Union students an inflation indexed tuition fee of £1,000 per annum1. The
replacement of means tested grants with inflation indexed tuition fees and student
loans undoubtedly raised the level of student debt. The average level of debt on
graduation is estimated to be £10,000 (The Guardian, 20 May 2003) to £13,000 (The
Push Guide, 2001) and may rise to £30,000 by 2010 (The Times Higher Education
Supplement 15 August 2003, 2). Students facing large levels of debt are increasingly
searching for degrees that offer value for money.
                                                           
1 These proposals were extremely contentious at the time. There was much unrest amongst students that
felt that higher education was being priced beyond their means. Universities in Scotland were not
sympathetic to the Government’s proposals and did not introduce tuition fees because they fell under a
different jurisdiction (the Scottish Parliament).
5Tuition fees have not compensated universities for the expansion in undergraduate
student numbers for a number of reasons. Professor Howard Glennerster argues that
to circumvent the political costs associated with the abolition of the free-education
principle, tuition fees were introduced at a low level (£1,000 per annum) and two
thirds of students are exempted from the requirement to pay full fees (on the grounds
that their parents earn less than £31,230 per annum). As a result, their introduction
delivered small sums relative to the needs of universities. Furthermore, following the
recommendations of the Dearing Committee, universities have been forced to cut
costs by 1% per annum at a time of increasing student numbers. Also, the public
purse’s HE contribution has in fact fallen from £8,000M to £5,000M in 2001-2002
prices between 1989 and 2000. Mass expansion and real term cuts in public funding
have contributed to a funding backlog estimated to be between £8B (Mr Blair,
Institute for Public Policy Research, 14 January 2004) and £9.94B (UniversitiesUK,
The Guardian, 9 July 2002). UK universities face particular financial difficulties
because the UK government invests less in Higher Education than many of their
counterparts in other countries (Department for Education and Skills, 2003; Mr Blair,
14 January 2004). For example, the public funding of universities is greater in France,
Germany and the Netherlands (1% of the GDP) than the UK (0.8%) and public and
private investment in the US higher education system (2.7%) is three times that of the
UK.
The funding backlog has caused a number of problems for UK universities. Building,
maintenance, library and computer budgets have been cut and academic salaries have
fallen far behind those of competing and comparative professions. Mr Blair (2003)
notes, "The shortfall of teaching funding has badly hit the salaries of academic staff,
which have shown practically no increase in real terms over two decades… An
estimated 1,000 UK academics have left jobs here for universities abroad, a quarter
alone going to the US". The Times Higher Educational Supplement (7 November
2003) reports that the average starting salary of a lecturer (£22,191 per annum)
compares poorly with the average remuneration of fire-fighters (£23,533 per annum),
police officers (£30,344 per annum), train drivers (£32,394 per annum), solicitors and
lawyers (£49,338 per annum) and medical practitioners (£66,454 per annum). The
Association of University Teachers (AUT) argues that university staff salaries have
declined 37% compared with the rest of the nation’s workforce since 1981. Table 2
6shows that academics received much lower pay increases than other public sector
officials between 1993 and 2002. Table 2 also indicates that the average academic at a
university in the US or Republic or Ireland can expect to earn a significantly greater
salary than their counterpart at a UK university. These sources provide a clear
indication of the extent of the worsening recruitment and retention problems faced by
UK universities.
- Insert Table 2 about here-
The gradual tightening of HE budgets and real term reductions in salaries have made
the profession much less attractive to graduates. The rate of academic recruitment has
been much lower than the growth in student numbers. These recruitment and retention
problems, combined with the reductions in per capita funding have increased the
number of students in classes to the point where the ratio of staff to students has
increased from 1:9 in the 1970’s to 1:17 today. The ratio of staff to students is
expected to grow to 1:23 by 2010 (Association of University Teachers, 2002).
Recruitment and retention problems are most severe in the medical and business
disciplines that attract large numbers of applications from students and have close ties
to the private sector. Staffing issues in these areas are exasperated by staff – student
ratios that are well above institutional norms. Furthermore, the salaries and career
prospects are much better in the private sector than in academia. Croner Reward notes
that the average starting salary of a finance director (£75,000 per annum) is more than
three times greater than that of a university lecturer (£22,191 per annum). A partner of
a large accounting firm (£400,000 per annum) or a FTSE100 finance director
(£609,600 per annum) can expect to earn a salary that is ten times greater than the
mean professorial salary (£51,378 per annum).
Several UK universities have reacted to these staffing and salary pressures by
threatening to privatise themselves to try to increase the level of funds raised through
tuition fees. For example, Imperial College made public their plans to charge tuition
fees of £10,500 per annum, University College London £7,000 per annum, Warwick
£6,000 per annum and Oxford £7,000 to £8,000 per annum. Mr. Blair summarized the
financial position during Prime Minister’s question time on 27 November 2002: “Our
universities have a serious funding problem. Provided that everyone agrees that the
status quo – the huge backlog of repairs to infrastructure and university lecturers’ pay
7increasing by only 5 per cent in the past 20 years, when the figure for the rest of the
economy is 45 per cent – is not an option, we should work out the right basis on
which to change matters. That is fully consistent with the need to get more people into
our universities.” The Department for Education and Skills (2003), hereinafter The
White Paper, proposes to allow universities to introduce a tuition fee of up to £3,000
per annum. The White Paper recommends that tuition fees become repayable when
the graduate earns in excess of £15,000 per annum. Universities would only be
allowed to increase tuition fees if the conditions of the access agreement issued by the
new regulatory body (the Office for Fair Access) are satisfied.
The proposals to raise tuition fees have been the focus of significant political debate.
Many commentators argue that an increase in tuition fees may force able students
from poor backgrounds to turn their back on a university degree because of the fear of
debt. Others argue that variable tuition fees will create a two-tier education system in
which students may choose their degree on the basis of cost rather than quality. The
Liberal Democrats have long argued that those earning in excess of £100,000 per
annum should be taxed at 50% to fund greater investment in education. The
Conservative Party recently pledged to fund the abolition of fees by eliminating the
50% participation target and scrapping the access regulator and grants (The Guardian,
13 May 2003; The Times Higher Educational Supplement, 14 November 2003).
Proposals to abolish fees might mean a return to the principle of meritocratic access to
higher education (HE). Eliminating fees may be a vote winner if the electorate
chooses to reduce the HE contribution expected from students and/or their parents.
Fee elimination would also reduce the likelihood of graduates accepting a low paid
job (below the £15,000 per annum threshold) to avoid repaying the tuition fee.
Furthermore, the abolition of fees would reduce the increasing number of graduates
that leave the country where fees are charged to avoid debt repayment (Chapman,
2003). However, the abolition of tuition fees, given no other changes in general
taxation, would imply a reduction in the monies available for already overstretched
universities, weaker students missing out on a chance of HE and an increased risk that
the UK knowledge economy would fall behind other countries. Hames (2004)
summarises, “The decline of higher education in this country over the last 15 years
has been so stark that the loss of top-up fees would be little short of apocalyptical.
The salaries offered at every level of academia, but especially to those entering the
profession as lecturers, have slumped from insufficient to embarrassing. To work in
8higher education today one either has to have some form of private income, be
devoted to it in such a missionary manner as to forgo any hint of materialism, or be
incapable of securing employment elsewhere”. The UK Government offered a
number of guarantees, concessions and increased bursaries for poorer students to
convince wavering politicians of the validity of their case. These last minute measures
ensured that the controversial second reading of the White Paper was passed through
Parliament. However, the Government’s majority was reduced from 161 to 5 votes.
These concessions and the reduced majority provided a clear indication of the
controversial nature of this Bill (see also The Times Higher Education Supplement,
12 September 2003; 19 September 2003; 3 October 2003; 7 November 2003 and 14
November 2003).
It is clear that the education and training of high quality graduates is vital to the
economy and the future of the UK. Mr Blair states that universities “employ more
than 300,000 people – and for every 100 jobs in universities themselves, it is
estimated that 89 are generated through knock-on effects elsewhere in the economy.
They generate over £35 billion in output, and it is estimated that for each £1 billion
they generate, a further £1.5 billion is generated in other sectors of the economy.
Higher education is not incidental, but central, to Britain’s future, and responsible
political leaders have a duty to see that it thrives.” However, without significant
additional funding, participation levels cannot be increased without severely
compromising HE quality. Many academics would like the public purse to finance
growth to the 50% target but this would require a resource reallocation back to the
pre-Lawson rates (BBC News, 10 January, 2003; The Guardian, 31 October, 2002).
The issues of how much money universities need to ensure their long term viability,
who should pay and how these payments should be made are questions that that have
brought university finances to the forefront of the political debate. The prior literature
focuses on moral discussions about HE funding (e.g. Wagner, 1998; Curtin, 2000;
Turner et al., 2000; Weiler, 2000; Di Pietro, 2003). However, quantitative analysis of
the effect of tuition fees on universities’ financial positions has been scant. This study
examines the determinants of financial performance and ability of UK universities to
earn a positive return without charging their European Union (EU) students a tuition
fee. The paper also estimates the break-even fee if academic salaries are brought into
line with those of comparable professions. The next section generates the hypotheses,
9specifies the accounting models and explains the data collection procedures used in
this study.
Methodology
This study examines the relationship between tuition fees, student numbers, proxies
for quality and financial performance. Operating profit is used as the dependent
variable to measure the financial performance of the universities in all of the
following hypotheses. The first hypothesis tests whether universities can justifiably
charge EU tuition fees assuming that the revenues received (other than tuition fees),
costs incurred and number of EU and premium fee students remain unchanged. The
independent variable is the level of the EU tuition fee. The motivation underlying the
first hypothesis is to test whether EU tuition fees are economically justified by
examining if a university can operate as a going concern without this revenue. Break-
even analysis provides a minimum justification cut-off point, although a positive
return on investment is of course sought by most business entities. The White Paper’s
proposals inspire the first hypothesis that estimates the level (if any) of the EU tuition
fee required to ensure that a university at least breaks even:
H1: Ceteris paribus, EU tuition fees are justified because the revenues received by
universities excluding fees, fall short of the costs incurred.
The second hypothesis extends H1 by examining whether tuition fees are justified on
the grounds that universities’ cost structures must change to bring academic salaries
into line with those paid in comparable and competing professions. The independent
variable is the level of the EU tuition fee. The motivation is to test whether a
university needs to charge EU tuition fees to pay for the incremental staffing costs
necessary to move academic salaries into line with those in comparable professions.
The financial statements are re-estimated to account for any additional costs
associated with the alignment of academic salaries with those of comparable
vocations. The level of the EU tuition fee is estimated that ensures that a university at
least breaks even after adjusting for any incremental salary expenditure:
H2: Ceteris paribus, EU tuition fees are justified because the revenues received by
universities excluding fees, fall short of the costs incurred and/or because academic
salaries are lower than those of similar professions.
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The third hypothesis assesses the relationship between financial performance and the
institution’s brand name reputation. The independent variable captures brand name
reputation using a dichotomous dummy that takes the value of 1 if the university is a
member of the Russell Group and 0 otherwise. The Russell Group of universities is an
informal self-selected set of research-led universities that meet at the Russell Hotel in
Russell Square, London. The media often presents the group as the state-funded
British equivalent to the US Ivy League. Anecdotal (1998-1999) evidence indicates
that the Russell Group occupied the top 17 positions in terms of total research funding
and the Russell Group had over 60% of the total research income of HE institutions.
The motivation for this hypothesis is to test if the Russell Group of universities has
differentiated itself from other institutions on the basis of research quality. This
hypothesis asserts that a university will only be willing to invest resources in the
creation of a brand name reputation if there are significant returns on this investment:
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between operating
surplus and the Russell Group dummy.
Hypothesis four examines the association between financial performance and the
teaching quality assessment grade. The Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) makes an
assessment of the quality of a department’s teaching. The independent variable is
found by averaging the departments’ official teaching quality assessment marks
across the institution. The motivation for this hypothesis is to assess the financial
implications of an excellent teaching quality reputation. This hypothesis maintains
that a university will only be willing to invest resources in the creation of an excellent
reputation for the quality of its teaching if there are sufficient returns on this
investment:
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between financial
performance and the results of the teaching quality assessment.
Hypothesis five tests the relationship between financial performance and the research
assessment exercise grade. The funding councils undertook an assessment of the
quality and quantity of research published by departments in 2001. The independent
variable is computed by averaging the departments’ official research assessment
exercise results across the institution. The motivation for this hypothesis is to assess
the monetary consequences of an excellent research quality reputation. This
hypothesis asserts that a university will only be willing to invest resources in the
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creation of an excellent reputation for the quality of its research if there are sufficient
returns on this investment:
H5: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between financial
performance and the results of the research assessment exercise.
Hypothesis six examines the association between financial performance and the
quality of the new students under the age of 21 entering to read for its degree
programmes. The independent variable is the average A’ level point scores of the
student intake in the 2000-2001 academic year. The motivation for this hypothesis is
to assess the economic impact of the recruitment of well-qualified students. This
hypothesis insists that the students with the best A’ level profiles will be attracted to
well resourced universities:
H6: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between operating
surplus and the average A-level point scores of entering students.
Hypothesis seven tests the relationship between financial performance and the
student-staff ratio. This hypothesis is based on the Higher Education Statistics
Association computation of the number of students and staff in universities between
2000 and 2001. The independent variable is the ratio of the total number of students to
the total number of academic and related staff. The motivation for this hypothesis is to
assess the financial implications of a high ratio of students to staff. This hypothesis
contends that the financial performance of universities with a high student-staff ratio
will be better than those with a low student-staff ratio because the former have used
their resources more economically. This hypothesis should be treated with caution
because it is not clear whether students would be equally willing to apply to and/or
accept offers from high student-staff ratio universities as those with a low ratio of
students to staff:
H7: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between operating
surplus and the student-staff ratio.
Hypothesis eight assesses the relationship between financial performance and the
institution’s expenditure on library and computer facilities. This hypothesis is drawn
from the Higher Education Statistics Association estimation of library and computer
spending per student between 1998 and 2001. The independent variable is the ratio of
the total amount spent on library and computer activities to the total number of
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students. The motivation for this hypothesis is to assess the economic consequences
of expenditure on the library and information technology. This hypothesis asserts that
the financial performance of universities that allocate large amounts to library and
computer budgets for each student will be poorer than those that have allocated their
resources more economically. This hypothesis should also be treated with caution
because students may be more willing to apply to and/or accept offers from
universities with extensive facilities as those with less well resourced libraries and
computer facilities:
H8: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association between operating
surplus and library and computing expenditure.
Hypothesis nine assesses the relationship between financial performance and the
amount spent on sports, recreation, health and counselling facilities. This hypothesis
uses the Higher Education Statistics Association computation of expenditure on these
facilities between 1998 and 2001. The independent variable is the ratio of the amount
spent on sports, recreation, counselling and health to the number of full-time-
equivalent students. The motivation for this hypothesis is to assess the monetary
impact of expenditure on facilities for students. This hypothesis maintains that the
financial performance of universities that allocate large amounts per student to
facilities’ budgets will be poorer than those that have allocated their resources more
economically. This hypothesis should again be treated with caution because students
may not be equally willing to apply to and/or accept offers from low expenditure
universities as those that spend large amounts on student facilities:
H9: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association between operating
surplus and the amount spent on sports, recreation, health and counselling.
Hypothesis ten tests the association between financial performance and degree results.
This hypothesis is based on the Higher Education Statistics Association database of
degree results for the 2000-2001 academic year. The independent variable is the
proportion of graduates that are awarded first and upper-second class degrees in the
2000-2001 academic year. The motivation for this hypothesis is to test whether
students will be attracted to apply to and accept offers from universities that have a
reputation for producing high-class graduates. This hypothesis contends that the
financial performance of universities that produce many well-educated graduates will
be better than those that produce poorly educated graduates:
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H10: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between operating
surplus and the proportion of graduates awarded first and upper second degrees.
Hypothesis eleven examines the relationship between financial performance and the
employment record of the graduates of the university. This hypothesis is centred on
the Higher Education Statistics Association assessment of the number of graduates
that take up employment or further study relative to the total number of graduates
with a known destination for the 2000-2001 academic year. The independent variable
is the percentage of students in graduate-level jobs or further study shortly after
graduation relative to all known destination graduates. The motivation for this
hypothesis is to assess whether students will be attracted to apply to and accept offers
from universities whose graduates are regularly recruited by employers. This
hypothesis argues that the financial performance of universities that produce
graduates that are attractive to employers will be better than universities that produce
graduates without desirable skills and qualifications:
H11: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between operating
surplus and the percentage of graduates in graduate-level jobs or graduate-track
employment or further study.
The final hypothesis tests the association between financial performance and student
efficiency. This hypothesis is assessed using performance indicators computed by the
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) for 1999-2000. HEFCE
compares the length of time student studied at each university with the length of time
they would be expected to study if they completed the course normally. The
independent variable is the proportion of students that complete their course in the
minimum length of time. The motivation for this hypothesis is to test whether there is
a financial and educational burden associated with students that are asked to sit
referred examinations. This hypothesis maintains that the financial performance of
universities that train graduates in a time-efficient manner will be better than
universities that train graduates in a less efficient manner:
H12: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between operating
surplus and the proportion of students completing course in the expected time.
These hypotheses are tested using the quality proxies adopted by the Times Good
University Guide 2004. Economic, academic and student data are collected from the
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Association of University Teachers, the Department for Education and Skills, the
Higher Education Statistics Association, HEFCE, the Higher Education and Research
Opportunities, and the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service. Staffing costs,
operating expenses, depreciation, interest payable, funding council grants, tuition fees,
education contracts, research grants, research contracts, endowment income,
investment income and other income data are collated for a randomly selected
population of 60 UK universities. Two universities are removed from the sample
because their data are incomplete or documented in a non-standard format that
prevents the estimation of break-even fees. The aggregated revenue and cost data of
these two universities are not materially different from those included in the sample.
The final sample comprises of 35 universities from the pre-1992 sector and 23
universities post-1992 sector. The average EU tuition fee for the final sample of 58
universities is computed by dividing the total EU fee by the number of EU students.
The average premium fee is estimated using the same method for these students and
the operating surplus or deficit is included in the break-even EU tuition fee analysis.
Hypothesis H2 is analysed by estimating break-even fees after sensitising staff costs
for any salary differentials. The relationship between the revenues and costs of a
university is stated more formally as follows:
[ ] (1)     jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt qpoverheadsoperatingstaffotherresearchfundingsurplus +−−−++=
where:
surplusjt = surplus (deficit) of university j in period t
fundingjt = government funding of university j in period t
researchjt = research income of university j in period t
otherjt = other income of university j in period t
staffjt = staff costs of university j in period t
operatingjt = other operating expenses of university j in period t
overheadsjt = depreciation charge of university j in period t
pjt is the tuition fee charged by university j in period t
qjt is the quantity of places available in university j in period t
Equation (1) can then be manipulated to show the break-even price (pBEjt )is:
[ ]
jt
jtjtjtjtjtjtjt
BE surplusotherresearchfundingoverheadsoperatingstaffp
q                                                                
(2)      jt−−−−++=
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Hypotheses H3-H12 are examined by regressing the surplus or deficit of the
university against reputation and quality dummies produced by The Times:
(3)                                        210 εββα +++= jtjtjt QualitynInstitutiosurplus
4. Results
Table 3 presents a summary of the 2001-2002 financial statements and break-even EU
tuition fees for the 58 UK universities in our sample. The first column shows that the
operating results vary between a £10,414,000 deficit (Bradford) to £20,583,000
surplus (Oxford). The mean operating surplus is £229,000 in 2000/01 and £656,000 in
2001/02. 25 universities report deficits in 2000/01 whilst 23 institutions report deficits
in 2001/02. These results imply that 40% of the sample failed to break-even when
£1,025 to £1,075 per annum EU tuition fees were charged despite the relatively low
staffing costs. If the number of university students, costs and the amount of public
funding remain unchanged, these findings suggest that nearly half of the universities
sampled must raise the tuition fee levy on EU students simply to ensure their
economic survival.
The central section of Table 3 shows that the total amount of fees paid by EU students
in 2000-2001 (£718,641,000) and 2001-2002 (£751,311,000) exceeds the revenues
paid by premium fee students (£402,242,000 and £471,551,000 respectively).
However, the total number of full time EU scholars (921,009 and 961,200) is ten-fold
greater than the number of premium fee students (84,549 and 94,165). The
computation of the average fee per student indicates the extent to which the numerical
dominance of EU over premium fee students is not reflected in fee revenues. The
tuition fees per EU student (£817 and £821) are significantly lower than the average
premium fees (£4,587 and £4,724). A survey by the Association of Commonwealth
Universities observes that UK universities currently charge their international
undergraduate students a tuition fee of £6,523-£7,639 per annum. The Times (20
February 2004) observes that these fees are 50% greater than those charged for
comparable courses in New Zealand (£4,451-£5,215 per annum), Australia (£4,131-
£4,389 per annum) and Canada (£3,911-£4,081 per annum). These results provide
compelling evidence that the fees paid by premium fee students in UK universities
cross subsidise those of EU students.
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The penultimate column of Table 3 shows estimates of the break-even EU tuition fee
assuming that funding, costs and student numbers are held at the 2000/01 and 2001/02
levels. Only one university (Cambridge in 2000-2001) would break even if EU tuition
fees were abolished. Break-even fees range from -£205 (Cambridge) to £2,752
(London School of Economics) in 2000-2001 and from £32 (Oxford) to £2,544
(London School of Economics) in 2001-2002. Ceteris paribus, the average break-even
EU tuition fee for the 58 universities is £809 in 2000-2001 and £803 in 2001-2002.
Consistent with hypothesis H1, if funding and student numbers remain unchanged,
most universities must charge EU tuition fees close to the current ceiling simply to
continue as viable business enterprises.
The final column re-estimates the average break-even fee sensitising for the 38%
salary differential between university and public sector professions implied by Mr
Blair in his speech during Prime Minister’s questions on 27 November 2002. One
should note that anecdotal evidence from previous pay negotiations indicates that the
government and/or university management are unlikely to sanction pay increases
much above the rate of inflation. Furthermore, a 38% pay rise is extremely unlikely
even if tuition fees are raised to £3,000 per annum. However, this computation does
provide an indication of the level of break-even EU tuition fees that would be needed
to reverse the decline in comparative academic salaries, assuming that all of the
monies generated by increasing tuition fees are passed on to staff. If the level of
public funding and number of students remain constant, only one university (Anglia
Polytechnic) can afford to bring academic salaries back into line with comparative
professions at the current rate of EU tuition fees. Ceteris paribus, the break-even EU
fee ranges from £1,032 per annum (Anglia Polytechnic University) to £7,470 per
annum (London School of Economics) after adjusting for the implicit salary
differential. Consistent with hypothesis H2, the average break-even EU tuition fees
for the 58 universities after sensitising wages increases to £2,608 per annum in 2000-
2001 and £2,634 per annum in 2001-20022.
                                                           
2 This would, however, still not address the doubling of the student / staff ratio that has occurred since
the 1970’s.
17
These findings confirm the widely held view that premium fee students cross
subsidize the education of their EU counterparts but they also show that this is so
even allowing for the UK government’s funding contribution to EU students and the
additional costs of recruiting premium fee students. The Times (20 February 2004)
notes that UK universities charge their international students tuition fees that are
nearly 50% higher than their Commonwealth rivals. This cross subsidisation evidence
implies that many UK universities are financially exposed to volatilities in the
demand for undergraduate degrees from the premium fee market. Consistent with
hypothesis H1, EU tuition fees of £800 are required simply to ensure that the average
university breaks-even under current conditions. Consistent with hypothesis H2, staff
salaries at the average university must benefit from all of the monies raised from
£2,600 per annum EU fees to bring them into line with comparative professions.
Assuming that some of the monies raised from tuition fees are spent on meeting the
demands of the Office for Fair Access (OFFA), bursaries and other concessions,
universities that wish to redress the salary differential must make more efficiency
gains, expand further into the premium fee market and/or raise the proposed £3,000
per annum cap on EU fees.
-Insert Table 3 about here-
Although there has been an extensive press debate about the legitimacy of differential
fees across universities, there has been very little analysis of the feasibility of variable
pricing across undergraduate degrees. Table 4 summarizes UCAS application and
acceptance data across disciplines to highlight variations in the level of demand for
degrees. Business Studies attracts the greatest number of applications from UK
students (39,758). European Business Management attracts the fewest number of
applications from UK students (3,168). The most popular degree measured by the
ratio of the number of UK applications to the number of UK acceptances is
Physiotherapy (12.43:1). This degree is also the most popular in terms of the total (EU
and non-EU) number of applications to total acceptances (13.26:1). Using the same
measure, the least popular degree for UK and students as a whole is the HND in
graphic communication (2.97:1 and 2.98:1 respectively). Electrical and Electronic
Engineering (2,880), Accounting (2,312) and Business Studies (2,296) attract the
greatest number of applications from students originating outside the EU. These three
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degrees also accept the largest number of premium fee students (513, 282 and 293
respectively). Unreported results documented in ‘Prospects Today’ show that the
highest starting salaries are offered to graduates from the numerate disciplines
(£23,671 per annum) and science and engineering (£24,000 per annum). These
demand and career prospects results imply that the numerical, therapeutic and
engineering degrees are the strongest candidates for premium fees should
management choose to extend the variable pricing adopted at the postgraduate level to
undergraduate courses.
-Insert Table 4 about here-
The left-hand section of Table 5 documents the OLS estimation results of equation 3
for the full sample of 58 universities. Consistent with hypothesis H3, financial
performance is significantly associated with the Russell Group dummy. UK
universities receive funding from the research councils based on the assessment of
their publications in the research assessment exercise. The Russell Group is a self-
selected small group of universities that try to differentiate themselves from other
institutions by producing world-class research units. The positive relationship
between financial performance and the Russell dummy implies that these universities
earn a strong positive return on their investment in brand name reputations.
Consistent with hypothesis H7, the financial performance of universities is
significantly associated with the student-staff ratio. The positive association between
financial performance and student-staff ratios suggests that the operating surplus of a
university will improve if it increases the rate of expansion of student numbers and
decreases the rate of staff recruitment. Short-term gains will clearly arise if the
university increases the amount of fee income and reduces salary expenditure by
failing to replace the staff lost through natural wastage processes. However, there is a
limit to the extent to which operating results are likely to improve in association with
increases in student staff ratios. The operating results are likely to be adversely
affected by the bad publicity, loss of morale and reduced productivity associated with
any voluntary or compulsory redundancies. Furthermore, a university that has a very
high ratio of students to staff may become unattractive to students and/or research
orientated academics. Any loss of students and research active staff would reduce
both tuition fees and research income.
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Consistent with hypothesis H8, financial performance is significantly associated with
computer and library expenditure. The negative association between financial
performance and library and computer expense implies that the operating surplus of a
university will improve if the institution reduces its investment in these facilities. One
must also treat this result with caution because significant cuts in information
technology and library budgets are likely to impair operating results in the medium to
long term. Students will be dissuaded from applying to and accepting offers from a
university that provided little or no library or computer facilities. Research active staff
may also choose not to take up offers from or leave institutions that neglect their
library and computer facilities. The operating results of a university that cuts its
computer and library expenditure might improve in the short term but investment in
these facilities is necessary to reap long-term benefits and because of externalities.
The central section of Table 5 reports the estimation results for the sub-sample of
post-1992 universities. Consistent with hypothesis H8, there is a significant negative
association between the financial performance of the post-1992 universities and
expenditure on information technology and library facilities. These findings suggest
that expenditure on computer and library facilities impairs the short-term results of the
post-1992 universities. However, the caveat that investment should reap long-term
benefits must be made for the post-1992 sub-sample as for the full sample of
universities. Students and research active staff may choose not to study and work at
institutions that neglect their library and computer laboratories.
The right-hand section of Table 5 reports the estimation results for the sub-sample of
pre-1992 universities. Consistent with hypothesis H5, the financial performance of the
pre-1992 universities is significantly associated with the results of the Research
Assessment Exercise. This result is interpreted as evidence that the operating results
of the pre-1992 universities will be significantly improved if the institution can
generate and maintain an excellent research reputation. Departments that produce
world-class research will receive the highest level of research funding and this will
boost the financial performance of the institution. There are more world-class research
departments in the pre-1992 sector than the post-1992 sector providing further
anecdotal evidence to support this hypothesis.
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Consistent with hypothesis H7, the financial performance of the pre-1992 sector is
significantly associated with the ratio of the number of students to the number of staff.
The positive association suggests that universities can improve their financial
performance by admitting more students or by cutting salary expenditure. The
marginal cost of admitting one extra student to a degree is low because the university
is already offering lecture and tutorial classes for this discipline. The marginal
revenue associated with one more student is the tuition fees paid and any government
funding. The admission of one extra student should generate a positive income flow
because the marginal revenues exceed the marginal costs. The short-term financial
position of universities will also improve by reducing wages and salaries through
natural wastage and reducing the rate of staff recruitment. Marginal increases in
student numbers and decreases in staff numbers should improve the financial
performance of the university. These findings suggest that the pre-1992 universities
that can attract academics able to teach large numbers of students and produce
international quality research will reap the greatest financial benefits in the short-term.
One should interpret these findings with some caution because there is a limit to the
extent that these arguments can be extended. Large increases in student numbers
create additional demands on academics, support staff, resources and classrooms.
Furthermore, able students are unlikely to apply to and accept offers from
departments that teach huge numbers of students in each class. Students are usually
attracted to departments with small class sizes because they believe that lecturers will
be able to devote more of their time to individual students. Also, staff numbers cannot
be cut indefinitely because research active academics may choose to leave to avoid
large increases in their workloads. Furthermore, the morale of staff members will be
adversely affected if a university chooses to undertake voluntary or compulsory
redundancies. These contentions imply that financial performance will improve by
marginal increases in the student-staff ratio but there is a threshold level beyond
which universities may find that their student fee and research income will fall.
-Insert Table 5 about here-
5. Summary
There has been an intense discussion about whether tuition fees are, in principle,
justified but relatively little empirical analysis of the need for tuition fees. This study
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finds that 40% of a substantial set of UK universities reported a deficit over the period
2000-2002. The average tuition fee paid by full-time premium students (£4,587 per
annum and £4,724 per annum) is much greater than the average fee paid by EU
students (£817 per annum and £821 per annum). These results imply significant cross-
subsidisation even allowing for the UK government’s contribution to the education
costs of EU students and the increased recruitment costs of premium fee students.
Many institutions report an operating deficit that would increase in size if the
revenues from the premium fee market were to decline. Ceteris paribus, EU tuition
fees must be raised above £2,600 per annum and all the monies transferred to
university staff if management wishes to use tuition fees to bring academic salaries
into line with other public sector bodies. The monies earmarked for OFFA, bursaries
and other concessions in the White Paper imply that the proposed £3,000 per annum
tuition fees will bring insufficient funds into universities to move salaries into line
with those of comparative professions. Furthermore, this strategy would do little for
student / staff ratios that have more than doubled over the last thirty years.
The financial results of the Russell Group of universities are statistically better than
those outside that group. These findings suggest that Russell Group institutions earn
positive returns on their brand name reputation. The financial performance of the pre-
1992 universities is significantly associated with student-staff ratios and the Research
Assessment Exercise results. These findings imply that academics that can teach large
numbers of students and produce international quality research will significantly
improve the financial results of their university. The financial performance of the
post-1992 universities is negatively related with computer and library expenditure.
This expense impairs financial performance in the short term but is presumably
incurred for long-term gain or due to externalities.
Admission and career data indicate that demand is greatest for the accounting,
business, physiotherapy and electrical and electronic engineering degrees that
command the greatest starting salaries and have the widest employment opportunities.
Despite the strong demand for degree places, accounting departments are at a critical
stage of development because of the substantial recruitment problems caused by the
huge salary differential relative to the profession, the large student to staff ratios and
the proximity of many senior academics to the age of retirement.
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Table 1 GCSE, A’ level and University admissions statistics
Year % of 16 year olds
achieving GCSE
grades A*-C
% of 18 year olds
achieving A’ level
grades A-E
Number  of
university
applicants
Number  of
university
acceptances
1994/95 73.8 85.5 419,422 290,596
1995/96 74.8 87.3 418,400 295,807
1996/97 75.0 88.6 458,781 336,338
1997/98 75.3 89.5 446,457 329,788
1998/99 76.3 96.0 442,931 334,594
1999/2000 76.9 96.2 442,028 339,747
2000/2001 77.1 96.7 453,833 358,041
2001/2002 77.6 98.3 461,365 368,115
This is an extract from Table 3.12 of the National Statistics 2003 publication, “Social Trends”, the
School Examinations Survey, form 113 FE survey, h t tp: / /www.dfes .gov.uk/  and
http://www.ucas.ac.uk. The GCSE data include grade A* from 1993/94, GNVQ equivalencies
from 1996/97 but excludes maintained and non-maintained special schools, hospital schools and pupil
referral units. The A’ level results include AS (half of an A’ level) and AGNVQ (two A’ levels) results
from 1998.
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 Table 2 Earnings: academics and comparators
Occupation 1993 2002 %
Change
Westminster MP £30,854 £55,118 79
Vice-Chancellor, University of Surrey
(including benefits in kind and pension
contributions)
£110,425 £184,000 67
School teacher (England and Wales) £30,441 £46,131 52
NHS hospital senior registrar £27,212 £37,775 39
Pre-1992 Senior lecturer £29,788 £38,603 30
Post-1992 Principal lecturer £30,426 £39,141 29
Academic salaries 2001-2002 UK £ U K  $
restated
US $ UK as
% US
Professor (UK average) 51,378 78,560
Professor (US (average $94,788/(9/11)) to
calculate calendar year salary
115,852 67.8
Senior lecturer (UK average) 38,441 58,778
Associate professor (US average $64,953/(9/11))
to calculate calendar year salary
79,387 74.0
Lecturer B (UK) 31,169 47,659
Assistant professor (US average $55,404/(9/11))
to calculate calendar year salary
67,716 70.4
UK £ ROI EUR UK $
restated
ROI $
restated
UK as
% ROI
Professor (UK minimum) 40,841 62,448 63.8
Professor (Republic of Ireland minimum
(including extra 1/19th))
87,075 97,947
Senior lecturer (UK top of scale excluding
discretionary points)
39,958 61,098 68.7
Senior lecturer (Republic of Ireland (including
extra 1/19th))
79,054 88,925
Lecturer B (UK top of scale excluding
discretionary points)
33,679 51,497 82.2
Lecturer (Republic of Ireland (to bar at point 12;
including extra 1/19th))
55,714 62,670
The above table summarises the 2003 salary claim prepared for the Academic Staff Sub-Committee by
the Association of University Teachers. The upper section of the table quotes public sector employee
salaries as at April whenever possible. The remuneration of the Vice-Chancellor of Surrey includes
benefits in kind and pension contributions. This data are taken for the 1993-1994 and 2001-2002
academic years.
The middle section of the table provides a comparison of the average salaries of UK and US academic
staff over the 2001-2002 academic year. UK data are average full-time academic salaries excluding any
non-salary remuneration of staff employed in pre-1992 higher education institutions. US data are
average full-time academic salaries excluding any non-salary remuneration. The UK salary data are
converted into US$ by dividing by a factor of 0.654 that is the OECD purchasing power parity data for
2002. The US data are computed using average salaries reported in Academe. These salaries represent
the contracted salary for the US academic year period that runs from mid-August to mid-May. These
figures exclude supplementary pay for teaching during the summer period. The US salaries are
converted to a calendar year basis by applying a factor of 9/11.
The lower section of the table presents salary scale points for the UK and the Republic of Ireland (the
UK’s nearest competitor). UK salary points are stated as of 1 August 2002. Republic of Ireland data are
for Trinity College Dublin as at 1 October 2002. UK and Republic of Ireland data are converted into
US$ using OECD purchasing power parity data for 2002. UK data are converted using a factor of 0.654
and Republic or Ireland data are divided by the EURO area factor (0.889).
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Table 3 Income Statement Extracts and Break-Even Tuition Fees for 2001 and
2002
Surplus
(£’000)
Total
EU fees
(£’000)
Total
premium
fees
(£’000)
Number
of EU
students
Number
of
premium
students
Average
EU fee
per
student
(£’000)
Average
premium
fee per
student
(£’000)
Break-
even EU
fee per
student
(£’000)
BE fee
with rise
(£’000)
2000/01
Total 13,268 718,641 402,242 921,009 84,549
Average 229 12,390 6,935 15,879 1,458 0.817 4.587 0.809 2.608
Minimum -10,414 3,801 229 4,187 179 0.303 1.279 -0.205 1.032
25% -1,361 8,510 3,324 10,815 828.25 0.680 3.426 0.605 1.899
Median 425 11,596 5,352 16,544 1,309 0.798 4.386 0.738 2.402
75% 1,729 15,841 9,101 20,846 1,825 0.893 5.813 0.952 3.160
Maximum 20,583 26,373 28,617 29,482 3,364 2.473 9.658 2.752 7.458
2001/02
Total 38,019 751,311 471,551 961,200 94,165
Average 656 12,954 8,158 16,572 1,624 0.821 4.724 0.803 2.634
Minimum -8,104 3,872 664 4373 261 0.289 1.712 0.032 1.040
25% -1,240 8,700 3,871 11715 947 0.692 3.469 0.585 1.873
Median 703 11,872 6,327 17558 1468 0.791 4.608 0.719 2.403
75% 2,408 16,995 10,705 21791 2013 0.889 5.874 0.961 2.960
Maximum 16,561 25,469 33,335 29732 3957 2.733 10.044 2.544 7.470
This data are taken from the HESA Information Provision Service and the 2001-2002 financial
statements of the following universities and colleges: Aberdeen, Abertay, Anglia Polytechnic, Bath,
Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Brunel, Cambridge, Central Lancashire, Durham, East Anglia, East
London, Edinburgh, Essex, Exeter, Glamorgan, Heriott Watt, Hertfordshire, Huddersfield, Hull, Keele,
Kingston, Lancaster, Leeds, Leeds Metropolitan, Leicester, Leicester De Montfort, Liverpool,
Liverpool Hope, Liverpool John Moores, Loughborough, London School of Economics, Luton,
Manchester, Manchester Metropolitan, Middlesex, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Oxford Brooks,
Reading, Robert Gordon, Salford, Sheffield Hallam, Stafford, Stirling, Sunderland, Surrey, Strathclyde,
Ulster, UMIST, Warwick, West of England, Westminster and York.
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Table 4 Admissions Statistics Across Degree Disciplines For 2000.
Subject UK UK Non  EU Non EU Total Total Accept-apply
apply accept apply accept apply accept ratio
Business studies 39758 5829 2296 293 43551 6297 6.92
Physiotherapy 21933 1765 952 58 25025 1887 13.26
Graphic communication 18310 3826 863 216 20119 4190 4.80
Information systems 15744 2815 1073 185 17259 3083 5.60
Accounting and finance 12638 1919 2312 282 15225 2242 6.79
Business administration 10664 1610 1971 272 13748 2127 6.46
Information engineering 9640 1983 730 106 10613 2169 4.89
Electrical / electronic engineering 6073 1197 2880 513 9814 1899 5.17
Fashion 8062 2007 450 123 8935 2204 4.05
Computer science/management 7348 1378 1076 180 8708 1599 5.45
Occupational therapy 7847 1389 132 12 8373 1446 5.79
Biomedical science 6913 1256 343 52 7633 1361 5.61
Film and television studies 6746 675 260 24 7410 736 10.07
Law and related subjects 6526 1171 305 27 7160 1227 5.84
Politics and history 6205 993 302 30 6978 1063 6.56
Business economics 5218 882 867 136 6667 1130 5.90
Hotel, catering & hospitality
management
5018 849 730 130 6277 1088 5.77
HND Business administration 5714 1331 145 39 5987 1387 4.32
Financial management/accounting 3948 461 1709 195 5834 674 8.66
Interior design 4862 1123 501 94 5698 1266 4.50
Industrial design 5059 1102 226 61 5542 1218 4.55
Mathematics / theoretical physics 4811 807 527 72 5491 913 6.01
Creative / performing arts 5281 807 49 10 5431 829 6.55
Photography 4488 872 207 53 5188 1006 5.16
Home economics 4888 986 58 8 5141 1027 5.01
Business and administration 3921 924 717 137 5064 1150 4.40
Institutional management/tourism 4320 660 267 35 4914 738 6.66
Theatre studies 4418 631 94 16 4719 674 7.00
Mathematics / computer science 3984 841 420 67 4516 931 4.85
European business management 3168 483 473 51 4273 663 6.44
Product design & manufacture 3829 884 135 23 4051 923 4.39
Animation 3636 675 136 33 4034 749 5.39
HND graphic communication 3818 1286 62 13 3942 1322 2.98
English and history 3700 692 63 7 3891 711 5.47
Criminology 3727 687 54 10 3856 704 5.48
Average 7778 1337 668 102 8887 1504 5.91
Minimum 3168 461 49 7 3856 663 2.98
Maximum 39758 5829 2880 513 43551 6297 13.26
This table summarises statistical data from the UCAS website www.ucas.ac.uk
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Table 5 OLS estimates of the financial performance model     
                                                       Full sample Post-92 universities      Pre-92 universities
                                                Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
Intercept ? 58546.17 0.86 1920.55 0.24 -9612.40 0.43
Russell + 4483.87 2.31**
TQA + -3118.38 1.34 309.01 0.62 -768.17 0.87
RAE + 201.20 0.24 -637.61 0.81 4573.53 2.05*
A level + -521.65 1.26 -8.85 0.10 -217.39 0.51
Student-staff ratio + 438.07 2.04* -158.36 0.91 905.32 2.16*
PC & library expense - -11.16 2.11* -10.05 2.10* 2.72 0.86
Facilities expense - -4.71 0.58 1.87 0.24 9.47 1.03
Degree result + -22.99 0.38 12.12 0.19 203.68 1.51
Destination + -265.39 1.61 -154.16 1.32 -66.81 0.59
Efficiency + -83.18 0.89 95.59 1.08 -127.33 0.69
N 58 23 35
F 10.698 4.876 8.978
R2 27.96% 19.83% 26.09%
*, ** and *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Russell is a dichotomous dummy that takes the value of 1 if the university is a member of the Russell
Group and 0 otherwise. TQA is the teaching quality assessment grading found by averaging the
departments’ official assessments across each university. RAE is the research assessment exercise
grading found by averaging the funding councils’ assessments of the departments across each
university. A level is the average A-level score of new students under 21 in 2000-2001. The A level
qualification is used in The Times league tables for Scottish universities because the established
conversion system undervalues Scottish Highers. Student-staff ratio is the number of students divided
by the number of staff, taking account of different patterns of staff employment. PC and library
expense is the amount spent per student on library and computer facilities between 1998 and 2001.
Facilities expense is the amount spent per student on facilities including recreation, health and
counselling over a three-year period. Degree result is the proportion of graduates awarded first and
upper second-class degrees in 2000-2001. Destination is the percentage of graduates in graduate-level
jobs, graduate-track employment or further study as a proportion of all graduates with a known
destination. Efficiency is the proportion of students completing courses in the expected time computed
by the higher education funding councils.
